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7.1 Introduction
One of the most challenging tasks facing development 
agencies, trade ministries, environmental groups, social 
activists and forest-focused business interests seeking to 
ameliorate illegal logging and related timber trade is to 
identify and nurture promising global governance inter-
ventions capable of helping improve compliance to gov-
ernmental policies and laws at national, subnational and lo-
cal levels. This question is especially acute for developing 
countries constrained by capacity challenges and “weak 
states” (Risse, 2011). This chapter seeks to shed light on 
this task by asking four related questions: How do we 
understand the emergence of illegal logging as a matter of 
global interest? What are the types of global interventions 
designed to improve domestic legal compliance? How have 
individual states responded to these global efforts? What 
are the prospects for future impacts and evolution?
We proceed in the following steps. Following this in-
troduction, step two reviews how the problem of “illegal 
logging” emerged on the international agenda. Step three 
reviews leading policy interventions that resulted from 
this policy framing. Step four reviews developments in 
selected countries/regions around the world according 
to their place on the global forest products supply chain: 
consumers (United States, Europe and Australia); middle 
of supply chain manufacturers (China and South Korea) 
and producers (Russia; Indonesia; Brazil and Peru; Ghana, 
Cameroon and the Republic of Congo). We conclude by re-
flecting on key trends that emerge from this review relevant 
for understanding the conditions through which legality 
might make a difference in addressing critical challenges. 
7.2 The Emergence of “Illegal logging” 
on the Global Agenda
While illegal logging has long been a domestic issue in 
many forested countries, the first glimpse of international 
attention towards illegal logging followed the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
(UNCED) (Gulbrandsen and Humphreys, 2006) in which 
the world’s governments could not agree on a binding in-
ternational legal instrument on forests. Instead, UNCED 
fostered attention on a non-legally binding statement of 
“Forest Principles” and Agenda 21 that emphasized na-
tional sovereignty and regional cooperation, such as pro-
moting “National Forest Plans” (Humphreys, 2006) and 
criteria and indicator processes that focused on defining 
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Estimated production of legal and illegal timber in the nine producer  
countries, 2013. 
Figure
7.1
Source: Hoare (2015)
Mahogany wood. Trading mahogany species is restricted by the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES). Photo © iStock: SafakOguz
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responsible forest management. The promotion of respon-
sible forest management through market based eco-label-
ling/forest certification programmes - exemplified by the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) created in 1993 and the 
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification 
(PEFC) - are important for an analysis of illegal logging 
for two reasons. First, they reinforced the importance of 
global forest products markets as not only causing pressure 
on forests, but also as a possible arena in which to promote 
responsible stewardship. Second, both the FSC and PEFC 
promote legal compliance as a first step towards achiev-
ing broader sustainability in global forest management 
(Leipold et al., 2016). All these efforts place in context 
global efforts to target illegal logging and trade which, 
by the late 1990s and early 2000s, became an increas-
ing concern to the competitiveness of timber interests in 
North America and Europe following increased flows of 
tropical forest products to consumers in developed coun-
tries (Leipold et al., 2016). This concern was reinforced 
by environmental groups, highlighted by the Environmen-
tal Investigation Agency (EIA), which drew on data from 
think tanks such as Chatham House to raise the issue of 
illegal timber in tropical developing countries (Leipold 
and Winkel, 2016). Figure 7.1 and Chapter 3 of this report 
provide recent estimates on the extent of illegal logging.
7.3 Global Approaches to Addressing 
Illegal Logging
As detailed in Chapter 2, following recognition from do-
mestic and international agencies, including the US State 
Department and the World Bank, that addressing illegal 
logging required international political action, the 1997 
Pivotal events in global efforts to address illegal logging
Year Event
1995–1997 Intergovernmental Panel and Forum on Forests refers to illegal logging in its proposals for action
1997 G8 summit agrees to an Action Plan on Forests which includes a commitment to eliminate illegal logging 
1998–2000 G8 summits in Birmingham and Okinawa issues statements committing members to address illegal logging
September 2001 Bali Ministerial Meeting: a Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) initiative in Asia is launched
2002 Indonesia signs joint statements or memoranda of understanding with the UK, Norway, Japan, Republic 
of Korea and China
July 2003 The President’s Initiative Against Illegal Logging is launched, committing the US to assist countries in the 
Congo and Amazon Basins, Central America and South-East Asia to combat illegal logging
October 2003
Yaoundé, Cameroon: 39 countries committed to a Ministerial Declaration and Actions targeted at com-
batting illegal logging, associated illegal trade, and corruption in the forest sector at the Africa Forest Law 
Enforcement and Governance (AFLEG) conference
July 2003
The EU’s Action Plan is officially released emphasizing increased support for governance and enforce-
ment in wood-producing countries, as well as mechanisms for voluntary actions to control trade in illegal 
wood products. Trading activities are added to the EU’s FLEG programme, renamed FLEGT
November 2005 Europe and North Asia Ministerial Conference on FLEG in St. Petersburg
2008 US Lacey Act is amended to include plants and plant products such as timber
2009 Ghana is the first country to sign a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU (later followed 
by the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Indonesia and Liberia)
2010 The European Union’s Timber Regulation is passed
2012 Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Act passed
March 2013 The EU Timber Regulation enters into force
November 2016 Indonesia becomes first country in the world to issue FLEGT licences verifying legal timber products 
Table
7.1
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and 1998 G8 “Action Plan on Forests” included formal 
commitments from the world’s largest global economic 
powers to promote the rule of law in the forest sector 
(Humphreys, 2006). For example, illegally-sourced tim-
ber was estimated to cost, on average, 16 percent less 
than legal wood, and thus was distorting international 
timber markets and undercutting the competitiveness of 
legally-operating forest industries (World Bank, 2005).2
These plans paved the way for the first of three minis-
terial meetings on Forest Law Enforcement and Govern-
ance (FLEG): Bali, 2001 (focused on Southeast Asia); 
Yaoundé in 2003 (focused on Africa) and St. Petersburg 
in 2005 (focused on Europe and North Asia). Each of 
these three meetings, which involved a broad range of 
stakeholders including government ministries, aid agen-
cies, business, NGOs and social groups, produced a 
comprehensive set of plans and commitments to remove 
illegal timber from global supply chains.
Arguably the most comprehensive approach following 
the Bali Action Plan was the emergence of the EU’s For-
est Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade programme 
(FLEGT), which focused on reducing illegal timber 
through bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreements 
(VPAs) between the EU and tropical timber exporting 
countries. Through VPAs, partner states assume respon-
sibility for enforcement by assuring the legal source and 
production of wood and by granting a licence to each 
consignment verified as legal before it is exported to the 
EU. The EU assists the partner in developing their timber 
tracking and licensing systems, and in strengthening their 
governance capacity. In return, producers and traders can 
place timber on the European market without any further 
proof of legality (European Timber Regulation, 2010). 
The VPAs are specifically constructed to be consistent 
with WTO rules, which allow for non-tariff barriers when 
both consuming and producing countries agree to such 
restrictions (Brown et al., 2008). In addition to EU VPA 
efforts, a second key catalyst, originating first in the Unit-
ed States, but then spreading to the EU, Japan and Aus-
tralia, focuses more specifically on amending domestic 
legislation to “weed out” illegal timber imports (Cashore 
and Stone, 2014). A third demand-side measure is the role 
of national governments in adopting “legally-sourced” 
public procurement policies. These efforts have been led 
by many European countries, but also have expanded to 
China, Japan, Mexico and New Zealand (Brack, 2014).
7.4 Country/Regional Cases
The story of domestic responses over the last 15 years 
has been highly dynamic. Policies in key consuming 
countries/regions encouraging legality compliance of 
timber imports – especially the United States and the EU 
- have significantly shifted from minimal or non-existent 
efforts to accelerating support. There has also been more 
cautious, but incremental, support from “middle of the 
supply chain” countries, such as China and South Ko-
rea. Though highly divergent, targeted producer coun-
tries have also shown increasing interest in drawing on 
incentives of “legality verification” of wood products to 
help foster “bottom up” incentives to improve domestic 
governance challenges. We now turn to discuss select ex-
amples of these changes over time, which we draw on to 
discuss lessons learnt and potential for future uptake. 
7.4.1 Consumer Countries/Regions:  
the US and EU
Initially, the US approach emphasized responsibilities of 
consumers to help tropical producers by providing capac-
ity to assist developing country governments in enforcing 
their own laws and policies (Cashore and Stone, 2014). 
However, the US broadened its framing towards “demand 
side” policies following the American Forest & Paper As-
sociation’s findings that illegal wood was causing billions 
of dollars of losses to the US forest products sector (Sen-
eca Creek Associates and Wood Resources International, 
2004), and recognition by some environmental groups 
that a focus on reducing illegal imports, rather than 
simply higher standard certification programmes, might 
have more immediate impacts on the ground in tropical 
countries. A subsequent coalition of environmental and 
US timber producer interests successfully lobbied for the 
US Congress to amend, and expand, the US Lacey Act in 
2008 to forbid the importation not only of illegal animal 
products, but also of plants (i.e. illegal timber). While the 
statutes leave discretion to suppliers and purchasers about 
just how to ensure they are not importing illegal timber, 
a consensus is emerging that one beneficial way to meet 
these requirements is to track legally-harvested products 
along global supply chains (Cashore and Stone, 2012).
In contrast to the United States, the EU approach to 
addressing illegal logging, as detailed above, emphasized 
the development of formalized negotiations between 
producer countries and the EU through VPA agree-
ments. This “negotiated agreement” approach is impor-
tant as it accounts for much of the responses on the part 
of developing countries reviewed below. At the same 
time, it is important to note that following the US Lacey 
Act modifications that targeted all imports entering the 
country, similar trade restrictions were taken up by the 
EU through the “European Union Timber Regulation” 
(EUTR). Domestic implementation and enforcement of 
2  In the very early days, the World Bank promoted legality verification through traditional direct financing incentive programmes. For instance, 
in Cambodia in 1999 pressure from the World Bank resulted in Global Witness acting as independent forest monitor overseeing Royal 
Government of Cambodia’s forests. This relationship deteriorated following a 2001 Global Witness report that pointed to Cambodian public 
officials as engaging in illegal logging activities. In 2004, the contract ended, and in 2005 Global Witness staff were prevented from entering into 
the country (Luttrell and Brown, 2006)
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the Regulation however, remain the responsibility of each 
Member State (Schwer and Sotirov, 2014).
In a similar vein, in 2012, the Australian Senate passed 
the “Illegal Logging Prohibition Act” (ILPA). The legis-
lation aligns with EU and US legislation in prohibiting 
the placing of illegally-logged timber, or products made 
from such timber, onto the market. This covers both im-
ported and local Australian timber. Like the EU Timber 
Regulation, the Act imposes due diligence obligations on 
importers and traders, which were defined in the 2014 
Illegal Logging Prohibition Regulation. The Act is simi-
lar to the Lacey Act, and different from the EU Timber 
Regulation, in not accepting a CITES permit as proof of 
legality, although such permits may be used to support a 
due diligence case. 
There were, however, notable differences in the types 
of domestic coalitions that emerged to support these poli-
cies. In the EU initially, environmental groups targeted 
domestic economic operators, traders and retailers by 
asserting that many of their imported wood products 
originated from illegal logging crimes in foreign coun-
tries. In response, traders and retailers eventually united 
with environmental groups to support the EUTR as a way 
to weed out illegal timber (Sotirov, 2014; Sotirov et al., 
2015). This coalition also argued that by reducing in-
ternational imports, the EUTR could also be seen as an 
important industrial development policy within the EU 
(Sotirov et al., 2015).
In contrast to the United States, European domestic tim-
ber producers, along with exporters from forest-rich EU 
Member States including Austria, Germany, Finland and 
Sweden were generally opposed to the EUTR. They feared, 
just as US producers had feared a decade before, that regu-
latory changes might result in their own domestic practices 
becoming a target (Sotirov, 2014). Unlike the US – where 
producers and NGOs worked out a collective effort to em-
phasize illegal logging as an external problem that origi-
nated abroad – EU producers had yet to be assuaged. In 
part for these reasons, producers identified technical and 
practical implementation, as well as WTO rules, in their 
unsuccessful efforts to reverse the EUTR decision (Leipold 
et al., 2016; Sotirov, 2014; Sotirov et al., 2015).
Given that individual countries decided whether, and 
how, to implement the EUTR, it is also important to note 
divergent uptake/implementation within Member countries 
(Sotirov et al., 2015). In general, scholars have found weak 
implementation within poorer Eastern European countries 
such as Bulgaria and Romania (Gavrilut et al., 2015) as 
well as in Southern Europe, particularly in Greece, Italy 
and Spain (Sotirov et al., 2015). Other scholars have found 
increasing coordination between EUTR implementation 
and FLEGT VPA processes, owing for example to the crea-
tion of the European Commission’s EUTR/FLEGT Expert 
Group, an informal enforcement network convened by EU 
Member State Competent Authorities, and the Timber Reg-
ulation Enforcement Exchange (TREE) network organized 
by Forest Trends, which brings together environmental 
NGOs and law enforcement authorities from the EU, US, 
Australia and INTERPOL concerned with illegal logging 
(Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2016). 
7.4.2 Middle of Supply Chain Countries3
The first formal approach from China to address legality 
verification occurred following the G8 Forestry Action 
Programme, which ended in 2002, (Toyne et al., 2002) 
and the “Bali Action Plan” on illegal logging. The Chinese 
State Forestry Administration (SFA), which has respon-
sibility for developing domestic and international forest 
policy commitments, recognized the need for some type 
of policy response. First, the SFA declared that illegal log-
ging was not a problem within China, but rather concerned 
challenges in other countries such as Indonesia. Second, to 
assuage concerns, the SFA signed a 2002 memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) with Indonesia designed to reduce 
illegal exports through information exchanges (Hurd and 
Simorangklr, 2011). Third, despite evidence to the contrary 
(Chrystanto, 2004), the SFA also provided assurances that 
its current systems ensured that tropical imports coming 
into China were legal. However, the MoU was generally 
viewed as a “paper exercise” with few observable effects 
in either country (Tacconi et al., 2004). No formal efforts 
were made to change internal policies governing legality 
verification. 
Beginning in 2008, China changed course by formalizing 
a nation-wide approach to legality verification. The hallmark 
of this effort was the development of the Chinese Timber Le-
gality Verification System, formally launched in December 
2009. This system, implementation of which would continue 
throughout 2010, draws on China’s extensive permitting sys-
tems to establish chain of custody for all legally verified 
forest products within the Chinese forestry sector (Sun and 
3  The section draws on Cashore and Stone (2014).
Office furniture made from rosewood (China)
Photo © Jianbang Gan
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Canby, 2010). China also moved to strengthen the original 
Sino-Indonesian agreement by initiating more MoUs/agree-
ments with other forestry product consuming markets in-
cluding the US, EU, Australia and Japan with more formal-
ized commitments and actionable items, such as enhancing 
communication around legal compliance challenges (Hurd, 
2011). They also created mechanisms to follow up on MoU 
implementation, such as the US-China annual bilateral fo-
rum on combatting illegal logging and associated trade, and 
the EU-China annual Bilateral Coordination Mechanism 
on Forest law enforcement and governance (Chen et al., 
2013).The SFA also undertook proactive efforts to assist 
Chinese operators, including issuing guidelines for domes-
tic forest operations about how to meet legal requirements 
in foreign countries where they manage and utilize the 
forest; and providing training to Chinese forestry business 
to better understand, and comply with, the US Lacey Act 
and the EUTR (Chen, 2016). 
International organizations like the World Wide Fund 
for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace’s China office also as-
sisted by developing voluntary guidance tools focusing 
on how export-orientated companies might meet interna-
tional legality verification demands by improving Chain 
of Custody (CoC) management. Currently the govern-
ment has drafted a full-fledged Chinese Timber Legality 
Verification programme (CTLV), which was followed by 
an industry association pilot study. The development of 
CTLV is continuing. Cashore and Stone (2014) argue that 
China’s more proactive approach is owing, in part, to the 
Lacey Act and EUTR amendments, which created stronger 
market signals, as well as assurances that China’s existing 
approach to the sustainable management of forests would 
be reinforced, rather than challenged. 
Other “middle of the supply chain” countries have also 
followed suit. For example, South Korea has, through its 
2013 Act on the Sustainable Use of Timber, focused on 
reducing both domestic and foreign sources of illegal tim-
ber (although the legislation has yet to come into force). 
The Korean government has also announced that it will 
introduce voluntary “due diligence” among timber traders 
and manufacturers by 2017. 
7.4.3 Producer Countries
Uptake in producer countries can be distinguished in two 
ways: those involved in VPA processes with the EU; and 
those who have responded to other global influences re-
viewed above (and in Chapter 2), as well as to their own 
domestic market pressures. We turn to review select cases 
of each. 
VPA-supported countries
As of September 2016, Ghana, Cameroon, Republic of 
the Congo, Central African Republic, Liberia and In-
donesia have all signed VPAs and are in the process of 
developing or implementing internal systems. Several 
other countries are in the negotiation or pre-negotiation 
(informing) phase, including Myanmar/Burma and Bolivia 
(EU FLEGT Facility, 2016). 
Cameroon
Cameroon signed and ratified its VPA with the EU in 2010 
that included a number of goals including: ensuring that all 
timber is legally sourced, transported and exported; pro-
moting good forest governance, and improving capacity of 
stakeholders to engage in forest policy and practice through 
resource and technology transfers. The government and its 
technical and financial partners are now placing efforts on 
developing a “timber legality assurance system” (TLAS). 
Some scholars argue that aside from stakeholder ne-
gotiations, there is thus far little discernible influence of 
the VPA process on the ground in the Cameroonian for-
est sector, largely owing to limited national commitment 
(Dkamela et al., 2014). Dkamela et al. (2014) explain that 
“internationally driven national forest policy processes 
tend to encounter massive implementation challenges” 
simply due to the fact that they stem from global priorities 
that may not reflect national policy agendas. For example, 
Cameroon’s overarching policy objective is economic de-
velopment given that it is a low-income country with high 
poverty rates. The national development strategy (Vision 
2035) pays little attention to environmental sustainabil-
ity, focusing rather on agro-industrial expansion, invest-
ments in infrastructure and manufacturing. Nonetheless, 
scholars have reported that the impacts of the VPA pro-
cess on other policy domains (e.g. REDD+, mining and 
land tenure) appear to be more significant than its direct 
impact on illegal forest practices in Cameroon (Tegegne 
et al., 2014). For example, there is evidence that the VPA 
advanced collaboration between Cameroon’s lead forest 
agency, MINFOF (Ministère des Forêts et de la Faune) and 
local NGOs to reduce corruption within the forest admin-
istration, and helped foster national implementation of the 
international climate financing mechanism, REDD+, as 
well as domestic land use planning processes (Wodschow 
et al., 2016). There is also evidence that the VPA-initiated 
deliberations are helping Cameroonian deliberations about 
how to address key United Nations Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals including reducing poverty and ameliorating 
global climate change (Wodschow et al., 2016).
Indonesia4
Following international pressures noted above, Indonesia 
first formally addressed illegal logging in 2002 when it 
initiated the Badan Revitalisasi Industri Kayu (BRIK, In-
donesian Institute for the Revitalization of the Timber In-
dustry), which was charged with monitoring and verifying 
of legal timber and issuing certificates of legality (Ekspor 
Terdaftar Produk Industri Kehutanan or ETPIK) to export-
orientated forest companies. However, this approach was 
criticized as being unable to initiate meaningful changes 
(Tacconi et al., 2008) owing to uneven standards (Brown 
and Stolle, 2009) and the relative ease through which black 
market certificates could be produced (Colchester, 2006). 
4  The following two paragraphs are from Cashore and Stone 2012. Our thanks to Tim Dawson for helpful comments on this section.
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In 2003, the Indonesian government appeared, on pa-
per, to step up its efforts by completing a draft TLAS, for-
mally known by its Indonesian name, Sistem Verifikasi Le-
galitas Kayu (SVLK). However, four years later, drafting 
was still not complete, leading many non-governmental 
organizations and international agencies to question In-
donesia’s resolve to follow through on its commitments. 
Yet by late 2007, draft legislation was submitted by the 
Indonesian negotiators to the Ministry of Forests for ap-
proval, and, in 2009 the SVLK was signed into law. In 
a departure from previous efforts that were criticized as 
limited, independent third parties were charged with au-
diting compliance with Indonesian law (Luttrell et al., 
2011). In addition, civil society is empowered to provide 
independent monitoring and to submit objections. In sum, 
the case of Indonesia displays a progression from no sup-
port in 1999, to weak support in 2001, to formal and leg-
islated commitments in 2009, followed by increasing sup-
port since this time. This ongoing support was matched 
by increasing roles for stakeholder groups to participate 
in standard development processes. Civil society repre-
sentatives were successful in championing good forest 
governance, transparency and accountability, as well as 
supporting third party auditing and independent monitor-
ing. 
The EU-Indonesian VPA was formally agreed in 2011, 
signed in 2013 and ratified by the EU parliament in April 
2014 (Yulisman, 2014), coming into force in May, 2014. 
Timber exports to the EU rose by 11.8 percent in the first 
quarter immediately following ratification (Suherjoko, 
2014). 
At the same time, given that much of Indonesia’s tim-
ber harvest is for domestic consumption, which is harvest-
ed by local chainsaw operators who contribute directly to 
the local economy, there has been growing recognition 
that much attention must be placed on domestic uptake 
if SVLK is to play a meaningful role in reducing illegal 
logging. Currently, legal timber is exported to more eco-
nomically advantageous markets, such as processors in 
Java or provincial capitals, which means that little tim-
ber is left for local consumption. Hence Obidzinski et al. 
(2014) argue that additional supporting mechanisms such 
as certification subsidies or incentives, capacity building 
and anti-corruption measures will be needed if SVLK is 
to be effectively implemented. 
In part for these reasons, extensive revisions and im-
provements to the SVLK and its governance arrange-
ments were undertaken following the joint Indonesia-EU 
Action Plan for the implementation of the VPA, which 
preceded the decision to start issuing formal licences by 
end of 2016. These revisions included subsidized group 
certification for small producers, extensive capacity 
building and training (for public officials, third-party au-
ditors and private businesses), more rigorous accredita-
tion procedures for auditors, stronger complaints and en-
forcement procedures, enhanced support for independent 
monitoring, and increased requirements for public infor-
mation disclosure about the SVLK verification process 
(Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2016).
Republic of Congo
In May 2010, the Republic of Congo became the first 
Central African country to sign a VPA with the EU fol-
lowing two years of negotiations. However, six years 
later, efforts are still focused on developing a Timber 
Legality Assurance System (TLAS) with which to la-
bel exports for the EU market. Several explanations for 
this slow rate of change have been posited including: 
conflicts over forest use - especially concerning forest 
conversion and conservation; elite capture/corruption; 
decreasing importance of the EU timber market; and 
government emphasis on promoting commercial agri-
culture and mining over forestry (Tegegne et al., 2014; 
Tegegne et al., 2016).
Despite these bottlenecks, practitioners and scholars 
such as Tegegne et al (2014) argue that the VPA process 
in Congo has had important indirect effects, including 
the increasing involvement of the private sector and civil 
society in national working groups charged with forest 
governance related issues in general, and revision of 
forest, land tenure and mining laws in particular. As a 
result, local communities and indigenous peoples’ par-
ticipation in management plans is now an official right. 
In addition, independent civil society observation – first 
established under the VPA process - has now become an 
important catalyst to enhance transparency in forestry 
policy circles. Likewise, and following these efforts, the 
Congo government now makes public a range of previ-
ously private documents including management plans 
and allocations of timber concessions (available through 
an online website since 2015). 
Similarly, as in Cameroon and the Central African 
Republic, the Congo VPA process has influenced other 
policy domains, such as REDD+ initiatives. For exam-
ple, independent monitoring of REDD+, which is under 
development by national stakeholders, draws on work of 
the Independent Monitoring of Forest Law Enforcement 
and Governance Trade (IM FLEGT). 
Log loader in Indonesia. Photo © Agung Prasetyo for CIFOR
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Ghana 
Ghana experiences high levels of illegal logging; conserva-
tively estimated at three to four times the legally permitted 
annual allowable cut (Hansen et al., 2012). The market is 
divided into a formal sector with harvesting rights issued by 
the government and an informal sector (chainsaw operators) 
without such rights. The formal sector produces primarily 
for overseas export markets while the chainsaw operators 
produce for the domestic market and for neighbouring coun-
tries (Marfo, 2010). In volume terms, approximately 70 per-
cent of the total timber harvest can be attributed to chainsaw 
operators (Hansen et al., 2012). Ghana, was the first country 
to sign a VPA with the EU in November 2009, with the aim 
to secure access to the EU market (Overdevest and Zeitlin, 
2016). The VPA, negotiated with broad stakeholder partici-
pation (Beeko and Arts, 2010), consists of a legality defini-
tion, a TLAS and a commitment for a comprehensive legal 
and policy reform programme to address more fundamental 
forest governance challenges. 
Implementation of the VPA has proven more difficult 
than envisaged, and FLEGT export licensing, initially en-
visaged after two years, is now expected to be initiated in 
2017. However, the VPA implementation has provided an 
effective platform for NGOs, civil society groups and private 
businesses to bring forward challenges in relation to illegal 
logging and forest governance issues through the VPA joint 
implementation committee known as the “Joint Monitoring 
and Review Mechanism”. It has also played an important 
role in enhancing accountability, learning and problem solv-
ing (Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2016). Examples of important 
steps forward include operationalization of the TLAS, 
streamlining the implementation of Social Responsibility 
Agreements that entitles local communities to benefits and 
services from the timber concession holders equal to five 
percent of the stumpage fee payment, a public procurement 
policy for timber, attempts to provide chainsaw operators 
with legal means (permits) for production, and new proce-
dures to reduce the administrative allocation of timber rights 
(Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2016). The long-term success of 
the VPA, some scholars argue, will hinge on its ability to 
address and find workable solutions for these root causes of 
illegality in the domestic market, including by enhancing 
the financial incentives for rural dwellers to engage actively 
in tree management (Hansen et al., 2015; Lesniewska and 
McDermott, 2014; Oduro et al., 2014).
Non-VPA countries
A second category of countries are those that have yet to 
engage in any VPA process but, owing to either previous in-
ternational influences and/or domestic events, are starting to 
initiate some type of legality compliance system, often with 
the support of civil society and business organizations. We 
focus on three illustrations: Brazil, Peru and Russia, each of 
which reveals the ways in which global pressures and incen-
tives play mediating roles in shaping domestic deliberations 
over legality verification.
Brazil
Illegal logging in Brazil is now recognized as a serious 
and persisting issue. Some estimates indicate that during 
the period 2000-2012, between 68 and 90 percent of for-
est clearing in Brazil was illegal (Lawson et al., 2014). 
However, the case of Brazil is distinct from the other cas-
es in this review because the vast majority of Brazil’s for-
est products are destined for domestic markets, rendering 
direct market incentives from the Lacey Act and EUTR 
less important.5 
Still, international influences are certainly felt in a 
number of ways. International norms, including “biodi-
versity loss”, “deforestation” and now “illegality”, have 
been influential in shaping domestic discourses and prob-
lem definitions. Certainly as an important producer, pro-
cessor and consumer of wood-based products, Brazil’s 
efforts to slow down deforestation in the Amazon during 
the last decade, have been the subject of strong interna-
tional scrutiny. In addition, and as a result, international 
aid agencies and non-governmental organizations have 
worked with, and provided resources to, the government, 
NGOs and business organizations in an effort to help im-
prove uptake of, and influence, domestic efforts designed 
to reduce illegal activity affecting forests. 
Several laws are relevant for those seeking to curb il-
legal logging. The Forest Code establishes the minimum 
parameters for conservation of forests within private land-
holdings, including Areas of Permanent Protection (APP) 
and Legal Reserves (RL). An Environmental Crimes Law 
sets criminal and administrative sanctions for behaviour 
and activities that harm the environment, including crimes 
against the flora – such as the destruction or damage of 
APP or RL. The legal framework is also composed of the 
National Conservation Area System (SNUC) – which 
establishes protected areas with specific restrictions and 
conditions on land use – and the Public Forest Manage-
ment Law, which regulates the exploitation of public for-
ests. Applicable legislation includes timber tracking and 
control systems at national and state levels, requiring 
timber transportation to be accompanied by documents of 
origin and corresponding cargo invoices. Logging must 
be carried out in accordance with a government-approved 
forest management plans or through an authorization by 
the environmental authority to eliminate native vegetation 
or to convert the forest to other land uses, while observing 
the limits and conditions established by law. 
Therefore, illegal logging takes place in Brazil when 
there is violation of laws on forest use and conservation, 
breaches of requirements related to the production, pro-
cessing, transportation and commercialization of timber, 
and/or lack of proper approval, or when logging is not 
in accordance with the obtained permit. Cases of illegal 
logging may also be linked with unclear tenure rights and 
land access. Timber may be illegal when sourced from 
public areas or protected areas, often posing threats to 
wildlife, indigenous peoples and traditional communities. 
5  Brazil’s planted forests account for 95 percent of Brazil’s timber products’ exports (Oliver, 2013).
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More broadly, illegal logging can be associated with 
fraudulent land titles, counterfeit permits, tax evasion and 
corruption. Illegal timber exploitation and deforestation 
can be closely interconnected, with timber often being a 
by-product of forest clearing for other land uses such as 
agriculture and ranching. Fearnside has found that illegal 
logging also increases the risk of forest fires in the Ama-
zon (Fearnside, 2005). 
In order to promote legal compliance, Brazil has 
pledged internationally to eliminate illegal deforestation 
by 2030. Brazil’s domestic law enforcement efforts have 
sought to curb illegal deforestation and improve legal 
forest management, including the 2003 “Action Plan for 
the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Le-
gal Amazon”, the creation of forest concessions for tim-
ber production in federal forests in 2006, satellite forest 
monitoring and real time detection of deforestation in the 
Amazon, established as part of the revisions to the For-
est Code, and new regulations that simplify environmen-
tal licensing in settlements to facilitate legal logging in 
2013 (Romero et al., 2015; Wellesley, 2014). However, 
the myriad of strict regulations and complex bureaucracy 
have also made legality difficult to achieve for many local 
and small-scale producers (McDermott et al.,2015).
In order to curb illegal logging specifically, the Brazil-
ian government has taken a number of measures, ranging 
from command-and-control instruments to enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure compliance, such as the “Docu-
ment of Forest Origin” (Documento de Origem Florestal, 
or DOF), a timber-tracking system created in 2006. The 
DOF is a federal, mandatory permit that controls the 
transport and storage of native forest products. It follows 
the product from origin to destination, and contains infor-
mation about the product’s source. Although some states 
have devised their own tracking systems, they will even-
tually be linked to the federal DOF system. One of the 
benefits of this instrument is that environmental agencies 
will be able to concentrate enforcement efforts on states 
and cities where timber trade is highest. 
Federal and state legislation have been initiated to 
help create conditions through which legality verification 
might be promoted, while procurement policies for con-
struction and public services are now requiring evidence 
of “proof of origin”. However, there is no fully function-
ing state or national policy requirement to verify legal-
ity along supply chains, and there is little communica-
tion with the US and EU about their import requirements. 
Some environmental groups point to changes in the For-
est Law in 2012 that seemed to make legality compliance 
easier by reducing the rigour of legal requirements.
Peru6
In Peru, the problem of illegal logging was formally 
addressed as far back as 2002, when the national gov-
ernment established the “Multi-sectoral Commission 
to Combat Illegal Logging” as a way to help enforce 
adherence to forestry laws and policies (Cornejo-Arana, 
2007). In addition, the US Lacey Act amendments to 
weed out imports of illegal timber took on additional 
importance in Peru given the 2006 United States-Peru 
Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), which entered 
into force in February 2009 (de Jong and Humphreys, 
2016). In particular, the PTPA includes an Annex on 
forest sector governance that was developed in response 
to concerns in the US that trade liberalization between 
the two countries would result in illegal exploitation of 
people and natural resources in the Peruvian Amazon. 
The Annex requires Peru to verify that all wood being 
exported to the US comes from legal origins (del Gatto 
et al., 2009) and, importantly, contains actual on-the-
ground commitments towards improving environmental 
and social resources stewardship. Proponents heralded 
the agreement as a new way to foster a “ratcheting up” 
of domestic practices in the global era (Jinnah, 2011), 
while maintaining a pro-growth development agenda. 
While the mechanisms set up for this verification give 
the US the option to participate in audits, the burden 
of auditing is largely placed on Peru (del Gatto et al., 
2009). For these reasons, and following changes to the 
2011 Forest Law, the Ministry of Natural Resources has 
committed additional resources to combatting illegal 
timber trade (El Comercio, 2015a).
Initially, some of the provisions within the trade 
agreement appeared to backfire, as it was used by ele-
ments of the Peruvian government to accelerate its de-
velopment agenda, for example through the granting of 
concessions to industrial users, especially in the min-
ing sector. Resistance from many private actors in the 
forest sector ensued, including public protests and even 
temporary occupations of government offices (El Com-
ercio, 2015b). There are also ongoing concerns that the 
emphasis on legality may undermine rather than support 
local communities because, while many Amazonian for-
est communities engage in timber extraction, the legal 
hurdles for doing so (including bureaucratic planning 
processes and unclear land rights) are so difficult that 
their practices could be deemed outside of existing le-
gal procedures (Pacheco et al., 2016). Meanwhile illegal 
logging in Peru has not declined significantly. Between 
2009 and 2012, a total of 66 percent of the timber was 
extracted without following planning regulations (Mejia 
et al., 2015). 
Russia
In the last twenty five years Russia’s forest policy has un-
dergone a number of reforms, including significant sup-
port for non-state market-driven forest certification (Soti-
rov and Mashkina, 2010).The global emphasis on illegal 
logging has coincided with significant domestic interest 
in Russia to address specific non-compliance challenges, 
especially loss of revenue from taxes and customs du-
ties. Failure to capture these revenues explains, in part, a 
6  For a detailed review see Cashore et al. (2016).
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five-fold increase in losses from the forest sector over 10 
years culminating to more than half a billion USD in 2014 
(Federal State Statistics Service, 2015).
Researchers have found that a range of factors explain 
persistent illegality in the forest sector including high lev-
els of corruption, lack of environmental concerns and fre-
quent changes in the legislation, which make it difficult 
to support meaningful legal compliance. Proactive coop-
eration among the federal and regional authorities to ad-
dress these issues is also hampered by federal legislation 
that protects businesses from being controlled by regional 
authorities (Vershinina, 2014). As a result, regional legis-
lation only affects small-scale local enterprises, leaving 
the larger holdings essentially unregulated. There is also 
a growing recognition that better enforcement of existing 
laws and policies is needed if meaningful management 
reforms are to be realized (Sotirov and Mashkina, 2010; 
Vershinina, 2014). 
Further to international attention and EU efforts in 
particular, Russia has initiated several changes with re-
spect to policies and laws surrounding illegal logging. In 
2013, the Russian Government approved an 8-year plan 
“The Development of Forestry, 2013-2020”, with the goal 
of reducing losses from illegal logging and increasing 
profits from the forest sector (Government of the Russian 
Federation, 2013). This followed the two plans on “Pre-
vention of illegal logging and timber trade in the Russian 
Federation, 2011-2014” and “Decriminalization of key 
industries of the Far Eastern Federal District, 2011-2013” 
(Federal Forestry Agency, 2013) 
In 2012, the Russian Government included timber in 
the list of strategic goods to be accounted for at the border 
(Government of the Russian Federation, 2012a; Molodts-
ova, 2014). In 2013, the Federal Law on “Amendments to 
the Forest Code of the Russian Federation” and the Rus-
sian Federation Code of “Administrative Offences” im-
proved the legal framework for harvested timber by intro-
ducing labelling, which coincided with the upgrading of 
remote monitoring systems (Vershinina, 2014). In 2014 
the Criminal Code was amended to include stricter pen-
alties for large-scale acquisition, storage, transportation 
and processing of illegal timber to be marketed or sold, 
including imprisonment for a maximum of seven years 
and fines exceeding the equivalent of USD 10,000 for se-
rious offences. 
In 2015 the efforts to control timber harvesting and 
trade culminated in the introduction of the “Uniform 
State Automated Information System” (EGAIS), requir-
ing all legal entities and entrepreneurs, dealing in timber, 
to submit all information on the volume of harvested 
timber, labelling and timber transactions into the state 
electronic database. From 2016, failure to comply with 
EGAIS entails an administrative fine. The question for 
practitioners and scholars is to understand better how to 
draw on these recent policy developments in ways that 
foster durable and meaningful influence on the ground.
7.5 Conclusions
What lessons can we draw from this overview of global 
efforts to address illegal logging and domestic responses? 
First, this is a highly dynamic world, rendering static an-
swers about impacts almost immediately out of date and 
of little utility to forward-looking policymaking. Second, 
impacts are quite variable, depending on local, regional 
and historical contexts, rendering sweeping generaliza-
tions difficult. Third, and notwithstanding, we can iden-
tify a myriad of international influences that appear to 
work to tip the scales within domestic settings, rather 
than determining “on the ground” outcomes (Bernstein 
and Cashore, 2012). Clear economic signals from US and 
EU trade import policies do appear to have been cata-
lysts within “middle of the supply chain” countries such 
as China in developing more formalized responses. At 
the same time, European Union partnership agreements 
with developing countries through VPAs expanded beyond 
market incentives by emphasizing capacity building and 
empowerment of local communities – a phenomenon con-
sistent with Bernstein and Cashore’s (2012) “direct access” 
pathway. Likewise, even in countries in which domestic 
markets dominate, international norms surrounding the 
problem definition of “illegal logging” as well as interna-
tional organizational influence through building of track-
ing systems and capacity, illustrate the important role that 
global efforts to weed out illegal logging can, and do play, 
in domestic settings. Similarly, efforts to “bandwagon” le-
gal compliance through trade agreements, such as in the 
US-Peru Free Trade agreement, identify the ways in which 
international rules can reinforce market incentives. 
The Russian case illustrates caution in being overly 
sanguine: there are simply too many domestic hurdles and 
incentives that contribute to illegal logging, to assume that 
global efforts to foster legal logging will be sufficient. Sim-
ilarly, a key theme from many of the cases from Africa and 
Indonesia is that while domestic processes have expanded 
to include local and civil society groups, there remains a 
concern that owing to domestic approaches to legality and 
Truck loaded with logs going over the bridge (Russian  
Federation) Photo © Fotolia: Stanislav Komogorov.
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costs of compliance, large scale firms may be better posi-
tioned to promote legality, while undermining local com-
munities – including fears that informal rights might be de-
termined illegal. A range of global actors and negotiators 
are working to address these concerns as they modify and 
adapt, agreements and approaches (Nathan et al., 2014). 
What we do know is that the extent to which these 
global efforts to address domestic illegal logging will end 
up being short lived, or trigger more durable reforms, is 
in part dependent on how international actors and domes-
tic partners travel two or more synergistic pathways over 
time. And this effort requires distinguishing the process 
of building legal compliance along global supply chains 
– what Cashore and Stone (2014) refer to as the “emer-
gence phase”, from the ability to have increased influence 
at a later time as legal compliance becomes increasingly 
entrenched in global markets. Certainly it seems likely that 
as combatting illegal logging is increasingly perceived as a 
factor of international market competiveness, further poli-
cy responses on the national level will emerge. 
It seems essential to focus on reducing the costs of com-
pliance through application of organizational and political 
capacity building among governments and the private sec-
tor and to building efficient technologies capable of track-
ing complex timber markets, in ways that maintain, and 
reward, domestic coalitions among businesses, NGOs and 
governmental agencies. This requires a careful dance in 
which legal compliance identifies important but achievable 
standards “on the ground” so as to not “knee cap” forest 
manager support. Once fully embedded to the point that 
shirking or free riding are not likely, Cashore and Stone 
theorize that legality verification efforts could be given in-
creasing responsibilities since, any costs would be borne by 
consumers rather than individual firms. 
Research gaps/next steps
Despite the achievements of the transnational campaign 
against illegal logging, a number of major challenges 
remain, to date, incompletely addressed. One major re-
search challenge is to assess the effectiveness of various 
efforts aimed at ensuring that smallholders engaged in the 
informal economy are not excluded by legality assurance 
systems aimed at international markets, but are instead 
supported to move into legal production while enhancing 
recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples. Another 
major research gap is to assess whether, and how, trans-
national policy efforts from combatting illegal logging 
have helped controlling agricultural conversion, whether 
formally legal or illegal. Such research will also carry 
practical lessons, especially since conversion has become 
the most important source of deforestation in much of the 
Global South. At the same time a key lesson from this 
review is that policymakers must be careful not to take re-
search from past impacts as static, but rather extrapolate 
implications from them for moving forward.
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